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BOOK REVIEWS 
Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, by William L. Rowe. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991. Pp. x and 189. $26.95 (cloth). 
JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, University of California, Riverside. 
Rowe begins by laying out the background against which Thomas Reid de-
velops his libertarian theory of free will. Particularly important here is the 
theory of freedom presented by John Locke. As Rowe understands him, Locke 
distinguishes between a free agent and a necessary agent as follows: 
S is a free agent with respect to action A just in case it is in S's power to do 
A should S will to do A and it is in S's power to refrain from doing A should 
S will to refrain from doing A. 
S is a necessary agent with respect to action A just in case either it is not in 
S's power to do A should S will to do A or it is not in S's power to refrain 
from doing A should S will to refrain from doing A (p. 3). 
Further, on Rowe's account, Locke holds that an action is voluntary insofar 
as the agent wills to perform the action and does so as a result of his volition. 
An action is free insofar as it is voluntary and it is true that had the agent 
willed to refrain from doing it he would have been able to refrain (p. 3). Thus, 
on Rowe's account of Locke, "an action of a necessary agent could be a 
voluntary action, but it cannot be a free action" (p. 4). So a man who is 
ignorant of the fact that he is locked in a room may stay in the room volun-
tarily; but as he is not free with respect to staying in the room, his staying in 
the room is not a free action. 
Rowe points out that Locke's account of freedom is inadequate. Locke 
claims that one is free to perform an action if it is in one's power to perform 
the action, if one should will to do so. But, as Rowe points out, a person may 
be unable to will to perform the action and thus lack the freedom to perform 
the action, even though he meets Locke's condition. Because of this well-
known problem with the sort of analysis offered by Locke, Rowe concludes 
that "freedom that is worth the name ... must include power to will or not will, 
not simply power to do if we will" (p. 14). 
After an interesting discussion of what might be interpreted as responses 
to the inadequacy of a Lockean conception of freedom by "necessitarians" 
such as Anthony Collins and libertarians such as Samuel Clarke, Rowe turns 
to a detailed discussion of Thomas Reid's theory of freedom. The crucial 
passage for Rowe's discussion is: 
By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand, a power over the determinations 
of his own will. If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not 
to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the 
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determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something invol-
untary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, 
he is not free; he has not what I call the liberty of a moral agent, but is subject 
to necessity (p. 599 of The Works o/Thomas Reid, D.D., Georg Olms Verlag, 
1983; cited by Rowe on p. 75). 
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Rowe denies that "Reidean freedom" consists in nothing more than the "nega-
tive thesis" that an agent is free in some action only if his decision to do that 
act is not causally necessitated by any involuntary event, whether internal or 
external (p. 76). As Rowe points out, Reid follows libertarians such as Samuel 
Clarke, Edmund Law, and others in asserting "agent-causation." What these 
theorists affirm is that "free acts of will are caused by the agent whose acts 
they are" (p. 76). 
Rowe points out that the standard interpretation of Reid's view of freedom 
is Lockean freedom supplemented by power over the will. Rowe says: 
In what follows, the first account of freedom (freel) is Locke's. I then state 
the standard account of Reid's notion of free will, using it to state the 
standard account of his view of being free (free2) with respect to an action. 
S is freel with respect to action Ajust in case it is in S's power to do A if S 
should will to do A and in S's power to refrain from doing A if S should will 
to refrain. 
S has free will with respect to action A just in case it is in S's power to will 
to do A and in S's power to will to refrain from doing A. 
Sis free2 with respect to action Ajust in case S is freel with respect to action 
A and has free will with respect to action A. 
For Rowe, a crucial insight is that (contrary to the standard interpretation) 
Reid does not say that the agent must have had the power to will otherwise 
(or to will to refrain); instead, Reid speaks of the power not to will (p. 78). 
Rowe elaborates as follows: 
Reid tells us that a willed action is free provided you had the power to will 
it and the power not to will it. Having looked at his view of agent-causa-
tion ... , it is clear that the power to will is the power to cause the act of will, 
and the power not to will is the power not to cause the act of will. According 
to Reidian freedom, therefore, any action we perform as a result of our act 
of will to do that action is a/ree action provided that we were the agent-cause 
of the act of will to perform that action. And since to agent-cause an act of 
will includes the power not to cause it, we can say that every act of will 
resulting in a/ree action is an act of will we had power to produce and power 
not to produce (p. 79). 
Thus, rather than supplementing Lockean freedom with the demand that the 
agent have the power to will otherwise, Rowe understands Reid to be adding 
the demand that the agent have the power not to will the action in question. 
On the standard account of Reidean freedom, an agent acts freely in doing A 
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only if "1) she could have avoided doing A had she so willed and 2) she could 
have willed to refrain from doing A" (p. 80). Rowe argues that 1) is simply 
not in the text, and 2) is incorrectly substituted for the power not to cause 
the act of will to do A (pp. 80-81). 
What is the significance of these points, apart from the goal of exegetical 
felicity? Rowe answers as follows: 
The importance of these two differences between the standard account and 
the correct account becomes apparent when we examine Reid's claim of a 
logical connection between responsibility and freedom. For there are, I be-
lieve, good reasons to doubt the traditional claim that an agent is morally 
responsible for doing A only if she could have avoided doing A. And there 
are good reasons to doubt the claim that an agent is morally responsible for 
doing A only if she could have willed to refrain from doing A (or avoided 
willing to do A). The significance of the correct account of Reidian freedom 
is that none of these reasons applies to it (p. 81). 
Rowe believes that the "Frankfurt-style" examples in which some "counter-
factual intervener" is poised to ensure that the agent wills and acts as he 
actually does, should he show any inclination to will or act otherwise, refute 
the traditional claims about the relationship between responsibility and free-
dom. But interestingly such examples do not cast any doubt on the require-
ment of Reidean freedom for moral responsibility. 
Let us suppose that there is a counterfactual intervener-perhaps a mad 
scientist-who wishes to see you kill Jones. He has rigged up a device which 
will stimulate your brain to ensure that you will to kill Jones and do so, should 
you show any inclination not to will to kill Jones. If you voluntarily kill Jones 
on your own and the scientist's device plays no role in your deliberations or 
action, it seems that you can be held morally responsible for your action, 
even though you lack the traditionally required alternative possibilities: you 
cannot wiII to do otherwise nor can you do otherwise. Rowe accepts these 
conclusions, but insists that this sort of case does not imply that moral re-
sponsibility for killing Jones does not require Reidean freedom. That is to 
say, Rowe argues that even in this Frankfurt-type case, you have the power 
not to cause the volition to kill Jones. As Rowe puts it, 
The scientist can cause our agent to will to do A. He does this by causing 
that act of will in the agent. But if he does so then the agent does not 
agent-cause his volition to do A. The real agent-cause is the scientist. So if 
the agent has the power to cause his volition to do A, he also has the power 
not to cause that volition. If he does not cause the volition and the machine 
activates, he nevertheless wills to do A-but he is not the cause of that act 
of will. ... the agent caused his volition to kill Jones and had it in his power 
not to cause that volition (pp. 85-86). 
Rowe thus attributes to Reid and also defends a version of what I would call 
a "flicker of freedom" strategy with regard to moral responsibility: this sort 
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of strategy suggests that even in the fanciest Frankfurt-type case, one can 
find at least some alternative possibility, even if it is a rather exiguous one. 
The Reid/Rowe flicker theory embraces the principle that a person is morally 
accountable for his action A only if he causes the volition to do A and it was 
in his power not to cause his volition to do A (p. 85). 
This flicker theory is very significant within the context of debates about 
the relationship between moral responsibility and causal determinism. If 
moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities and causal determinism 
rules out such possibilities, then casual determinism rules out moral respon-
sibility. Some philosophers have argued that since Frankfurt-type examples 
show that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities of the 
traditional sort, causal determinism need not be incompatible with moral 
responsibility, even if causal determinism rules out traditionally construed 
alternative possibilities. But the Reid/Rowe view points out that even if the 
Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility does not require al-
ternative possibilities as traditionally interpreted, it does require alternative 
possibilities: moral responsibility requires at least a flicker of freedom. Fur-
ther, the most powerful argument for the conclusion that causal determinism 
rules out alternative possibilities of the traditional sort also implies that 
causal determinism rules out alternatives possibilities of the sort envisaged 
by Rowe and Reid; causal determinism extinguishes even the flicker of free-
dom. Thus, there is good reason stemming from the analysis of Reid and 
Rowe to claim that causal determinism is incompatible with moral responsi-
bility, even granting the kernel of Frankfurt's examples. l 
[ believe that the Rowe/Reid flicker theory is fascinating and powerful. It 
bears considerably more scrutiny and discussion than I can give it here. My 
basic worry is that although Reid and Rowe have shown that there is always 
some way of describing cases (even of the Frankfurt sort) such that one can 
find some alternative possibility, this alternative possibility is not sufficiently 
robust to ground moral responsibility ascriptions. Put slightly differently, 
even if there are flickers of freedom of the sort identified by Reid and Rowe, 
it is not plausible to suppose that it is in virtue of their existence that we are 
morally responsible. It is not enough to secure the Rowe/Reid position to 
point out that one can always find some sort of alternative possibility, even 
in Frankfurt-type cases. What needs to be shown is that these alternative 
possibilities playa certain role: that it is these alternative possibilities which 
ground and explain our moral responsibility. And this is what I find somewhat 
unnatural and implausible. 
To elaborate a bit. If one is an alternative-possibilities theorist, one should 
be inclined to the view that agents must have alternative possibilities of a 
certain sort, if they are to be held morally responsible. There are supposed 
to be various pathways into the future which are genuinely open to the agent, 
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and these paths must have certain properties. It is not enough, for the alter-
native possibilities theorist, to point out that an agent has various genuinely 
available paths into the future, on only one of which the agent acts freely. 
That is, it is not enough for such a theorist that all but one path into the future 
is such that the agent in question does not act freely. And yet this is precisely 
the situation in the Frankfurt-type cases. It may be that in the Frankfurt-type 
case discussed above, the agent has the power not to cause a volition to kill 
Jones. But in not causing such a volition the agent would not be acting freely; 
because of the nature of the intervention, it would not be appropriate to say 
that in the alternative scenario (in which the scientist's machine intervenes) 
the agent freely refrains from causing the volition to kill Jones. Thus, even 
if a certain sort of alternative possibility-a flicker of freedom-exists, it 
does not appear to have the requisite properties. Such a flicker is too thin and 
insubstantial to ground moral responsibility ascriptions. 
On the traditional alternative possibilities picture, it is envisaged that an 
agent has a choice between two scenarios of a certain sort. In one scenario, 
she deliberates and forms an intention to do an act of a certain kind and then 
carries out this intention in an appropriate way. This is what is involved in 
having robust alternative possibilities; in at least one other scenario, she 
deliberates and forms an intention to do a different kind of act (or no act at 
all) and carries out this intention in an appropriate way. But it is evident that 
in Frankfurt-type examples these conditions do not obtain: the alternative 
scenarios are not of the requisite kind. On the Rowe/Reid alternative possi-
bilities picture, it is envisaged that an agent has at least some scenarios 
available to her in which she fails to cause the volition in question. But note 
that even if this is so in the Frankfurt-type cases, in the alternative scenarios 
the agent does not form an intention to refrain from causing the volition in 
question and then proceed to carry out this intention in an appropriate way. 
Thus, even if there is a flicker of freedom in these cases, it does not seem to 
be robust enough to ground responsibility ascriptions. The traditional alter-
native possibilities picture links moral responsibility with control of a certain 
kind; but for this kind of control to exist, surely the alternative scenarios 
which are invoked to ground the attributions of responsibility must be more 
robust. 
Although I find the flicker theory unsatisfying, it is an important and 
interesting view which deserves more sustained and careful attention. Also, 
I cannot here discuss other aspects of Rowe's book, including his nice dis-
cussion of various objections to the sort of libertarian view presented by Reid. 
I wish however to offer some overall impressions of this book. The book is 
very elegantly written. It is a lovely, careful, and insightful piece of exegesis; 
as such, it should make an important contribution to our understanding of 
Thomas Reid's work. But the book offers more. It is a penetrating and pow-
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erful piece of philosophy. Rowe lays bare the crucial elements of all the views 
he attends to, especially Locke's conception of freedom and the libertarian 
alternative developed by Thomas Reid. And Rowe pinpoints their strengths 
and weaknesses with uncanny brilliance. Finally, he explores the libertarian 
conception of freedom with a degree of care, precision, and insight which is 
both admirable and quite rare in the philosophical literature. Rowe has given 
us a wonderful book. 
NOTE 
1. In my paper, "Responsibility and Control," Journal o/Philosophy, 89 (January 1982), 
pp. 24-40, I pursue a strategy that is similar to the Reid/Rowe strategy to the extent that 
they both acknowledge certain implications of the Frankfurt-type examples but insist that 
these examples do not in themselves entail the compatibility of causal determinism and 
moral responsibility. But there is the following difference: whereas the Rowe/Reid strategy 
is a flicker-of-freedom approach and is thus an "alternative-sequence" model of moral 
responsibility, my approach in "Responsibility and Control" is an "actual-sequence" 
model of moral responsibility. 
The Philosophy In Christianity, edited by Godfrey Vesey. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989. pp. xvi and 244. $16.95 (paper). 
M. JAMIE FERREIRA, University of Virginia. 
This collection of essays represents an unusually broad-ranging sampler of 
studies, both because it covers philosophical theology, historical theology, 
and philosophy of religion and because the essays are by scholars of classical, 
patristic, medieval, and contemporary thought. Moreover, it has, in a sense, 
two themes; these are not co-extensive, but overlap and weave together in 
interesting ways. The general aim stated by Vesey in the introduction-
namely, to explore the "debt" of "early" Christian thinkers "to contemporary 
Platonist philosophy" (p. v)-is adhered to by most, but not all, of the con-
tributors. At one end of the spectrum are essays paradigmatic of that theme, 
like John Dillon's "Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence on Early 
Christianity" and A. H. Armstrong's "On Not Knowing Too Much About 
God," subtitled "The Apophatic Way of the Neoplatonists and other influ-
ences from ancient philosophy which have worked against dogmatic assertion 
in Christian thinking." At the other end are essays, extremely valuable in their 
own right, but totally innocent of any (explicit, at least) concern with Platon-
ist influence on or relevance to Christianity. Those readers with such a con-
cern will find in those essays (the majority) which do adhere rigidly to Vesey's 
formulation of the guiding theme a very satisfying development of thought 
on the subject; they build on each other in interesting ways, in part because 
of the useful back-and-forth between detail and overview among them. 
